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BANGOR GAS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 
COURT’S DECISION IN OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
ADVOCATE V. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
Taylor Talmage* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With a turn of the thermostat, your gas furnace fires up to provide heat on a 
cold winter night. With the flick of a switch, the lights come on in your home.  
Both of these actions are common everyday occurrences, and both rely on 
regulated public utilities to supply the energy necessary to achieve the desired ends.  
For a vast majority of Mainers hardly any thought is likely given to these actions or 
the complicated regulatory framework that allows this energy to reach their homes.  
Yet energy use, as well as the accompanying body of law and policy that regulates 
energy utilities, pervades all aspects of modern society.  Not only does energy 
power our consumer products and heat our homes, it also powers the industrial and 
commercial businesses that provide jobs and generate growth in our economy. In 
fact, as commentators have long noted, complex modern societies, such as ours, are 
completely dependent upon utility service.1  This dependence is only strengthened 
as technological advancements continue and critical sectors of society, such as 
banking and finance, become ever more reliant on technology.  Thus, as our 
dependence increases and energy plays an ever more important role in our society, 
it becomes progressively more important that the legal framework regulating 
energy utilities serves the public interest.2 
In Maine, the Public Utilities Commission (the “Commission” or “PUC”) was 
first established in 1913.3  The basic purpose of the Commission is “to ensure safe, 
reasonable and adequate service, to assist in minimizing the cost of energy 
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 1.  MARTIN T. FARRIS & ROY J. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES 4 (1973). 
 2.  The intersection of utility law and policy in Maine has received much attention by both the 
public and the Governor in recent years.  See, e.g., Scott Thistle, LePage Continues Effort to Lower 
Energy Costs for Maine Ratepayers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 5, 2014, 
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/05/politics/lepage-continues-effort-to-lower-energy-costs-for-
maine-ratepayers/; Tux Turkel, PUC staff: Maine Electricity Ratepayers Shouldn’t be Charged for 
Natural Gas Pipeline Expansion, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 1, 2014, 
http://www.pressherald.com/2014/10/01/puc-staff-maine-electric-ratepayers-shouldnt-be-charged-to-
secure-natural-gas-delivery-contracts/.  Policy was specifically cited by the Public Utilities Commission 
as one factor guiding their decision in the order that gave rise to case on which this Note focuses.  
Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year Rate Plan (35-A M.R.S. § 4706), 
No. 2012-00598, Order at 8-9 (Me. P.U.C. 2014) (“[A] key factor underlying the design of the prior rate 
plans, that being to encourage the expansion of natural gas service in Maine, remains an important 
policy goal today.”).  
 3.  P.L. 1913 ch. 129 §§ 1, 10. 
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available to the State’s consumers and to ensure that the rates of public utilities 
subject to rate regulation are just and reasonable to customers and public utilities.”4  
The purpose of the requirement that rates must be “just and reasonable” is to ensure 
that a natural monopoly, such as an energy utility, sets its prices in a manner which 
allows it to meet all reasonable demand for its services.5  While regulatory bodies 
are given discretion in determining what constitutes a “just and reasonable” rate, 
they do not act wholly without guidelines set by the Legislature.6  Specifically, the 
Legislature has set guidelines that the Commission must follow when determining 
the value of utility property for the purpose of setting rates that will allow the 
utility to recover its investment in that property.7  These guidelines, as set forth in 
title 35-A, section 303 of the Maine Revised Statutes, are the focus of this Case 
Note. 
This Note will examine a recent case, Office of the Public Advocate v. Public 
Utilities Commission, in which the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the 
Law Court, affirmed a decision of the Commission granting Bangor Natural Gas 
Co.’s (“Bangor Gas”) request to renew its alternative rate plan.8  This Note argues 
that the Law Court erred when it affirmed the Commission’s order setting an 
alternative rate plan for Bangor Gas.  In setting the alternative rate plan the 
Commission adopted a value of Bangor Gas’s property that was based upon the $38 
million invested into the company by Bangor Gas’s former owner, Sempra, and not 
the $500,000 that Bangor Gas’s current owner, Energy West Inc., paid to acquire 
the company in 2007.9  By only using the larger value the Commission abused its 
discretion when it assigned no weight to the $500,000 acquisition cost.  Although 
the Commission can be said to have “considered” the acquisition cost, the 
Commission did not give it the “due consideration” required by statute and thus 
failed to follow the mandate of the Legislature.  This Note argues that, by holding 
that the decision was properly made within the discretion of the PUC, the Law 
Court did more than just affirm a decision of the Commission that was made 
contrary to the law.  More notably, through that affirmance, the Law Court 
permitted Energy West to obtain a return on a $38 million dollar investment that the 
                                                                                                     
 4.  35-A M.R.S.A. § 101 (2010 & Supp. 2015). 
 5.  DAVID C. HJELMFELT, ANTITRUST AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES 134 (1985). 
 6.  City of Biddeford by Bd. of Ed. v. Biddeford Teachers Ass’n, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (1973) (“[I]t is 
well established that a legislative body cannot delegate the legislative power without including in the 
delegating statute sufficient standards to guide the agents in the exercise of the legislative authority.”); 
Uliano v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2009 ME 89, ¶ 15, 977 A.2d 400 (“[L]egislation delegating discretionary 
authority to an administrative agency is unconstitutional if it fails to ‘contain standards sufficient to 
guide administrative action.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 433 A.2d 743, 747 (Me. 
1981)). 
 7.  Title 35-A of the Maine Revised Statutes provides the statutory backbone of the PUC’s 
administrative authority.  The focus of this Note will be on section 303, which governs the valuation of 
property for the purposes of fixing rates charged by regulated utilities.  35-A M.R.S.A. § 303 (2010 & 
Supp. 2015). 
 8.  Office of the Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2015 ME 113, 122 A.3d 959 [hereinafter 
Bangor Gas]; see also Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year Rate Plan 
(35-A M.R.S. § 4706), No. 2012-00598, Order (Me. P.U.C. 2014).  
 9.  Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year Rate Plan (35-A M.R.S. 
§ 4706), No. 2012-00598, Order at 14-15 (Me. P.U.C. 2014) 112007.  
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company did not make and for which the company did not bear the risk of loss.10  
In doing so, the Law Court violated a fundamental principle of utility law: investors 
are only entitled to a return on investments they have actually made.11 
Part II of this Note discusses the evolution of laws concerning the valuation of 
property to be included in rate base and the formulation of the fundamental 
principle that investors are only entitled to a return on their investments actually 
made.  Part III provides the factual background and holding of the Law Court’s 
opinion in Bangor Gas.  Finally, Part IV analyzes the Law Court’s opinion,12 
focusing particularly on the court’s failure to discuss the fundamental principle that 
investors are entitled to a return only on investments they have actually made; why 
this discussion may have been absent from the opinion; why, despite this absence, 
the court still committed error in affirming its decision; and a brief examination of 
the court’s response to the Public Advocate’s argument that the Commission used 
an unlawful factor—the current value of Bangor Gas’s assets—in its decision.13 
II. A HISTORY OF THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY INCLUDED IN RATE BASE 
One of the principle obligations of a utility regulator is to ensure that rates 
charged by public utilities are “just and reasonable” to consumers and allow for a 
“fair return” for investors on the capital invested in the utility.14  In assessing what 
constitutes a reasonable or fair rate, commentators have noted that there are three 
major steps in making a determination.  The first step is to determine what 
constitutes the value of the utilities property.15  This is known as the utility’s “rate 
base.”16  Second, one must determine what constitutes the utility’s return.17  Third, 
based on the first two factors, the regulator must finally determine what the utility 
should be allowed to earn on its property investment.18  While factors two and three 
are undoubtedly worthy of discussion, it is only the first of these three, the value of 
the utility’s rate base, that is the focus of this Note.  What follows in this Section 
will be a discussion of the various methods that have been used to determine the 
value of a utility’s rate base and the current methodology that the Legislature has 
established for making this determination in Maine. 
                                                                                                     
 10.  Not only does Energy West not bear the risk of losing the $38 million invested by Sempra, but 
this loss was already realized by Sempra when it sold Bangor Gas to Energy West for $500,000.  “[I]n 
2006, Sempra recognized an impairment loss which reduced its net book value to $0.”  See id. at 11. 
 11.  See Me. Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 388 A.2d 493 (Me. 1978); Rangeley Water Co. v. 
Rangeley Water Dist., 1997 ME 32, 691 A.2d 171; infra text accompanying notes 46-52. 
 12.  In its decision the Law Court also addressed the OPA’s argument that the commission abused its 
discretion by including a portion of Bangor Gas’s regulatory proceeding expenses in its revenue 
requirement calculation.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶¶ 23-25, 122 A.3d 959.  This second contention 
by the OPA will not be addressed in this Note, however. 
 13.  See Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 22, 122 A.3d 959.  In total the Court devotes one paragraph 
of its opinion to discussing the OPA’s argument that the PUC unlawfully used the current value of the 
Bangor Gas property when determining the value of the property included in rate base. 
 14.  CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 281 (1984). 
 15.  FARRIS & SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 80. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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A. The Fair Value Doctrine 
In 1898, the United States Supreme Court, in Smyth v. Ames,19 enunciated what 
became known as the “fair value doctrine” of rate base valuation.20  In Smyth, the 
Court held that “the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates must 
be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the 
public.”21  The Court enumerated six factors that should be considered in 
determining this “fair value.”22  Among these were: “the original cost of 
construction and the cost of permanent improvements” and “the present as 
compared with the original cost of construction.”23  While this may seem fairly 
straightforward, in the years following Smyth, regulatory bodies and the courts 
tasked with reviewing the decisions of those bodies frequently struggled to employ 
the Court’s guidance.24  This confusion was due, in part, to the Court’s instruction 
that each measure must be given “such weight as may be just and right.”25  
However, beginning in the 1930s and culminating in the Court’s 1944 decision in 
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,26 the Court shifted its emphasis 
away from requiring adherence to the imprecise “fair value method.”27  
B. Hope Natural Gas 
In Hope, the Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit after it set aside a Federal Power Commission order that decreased a 
company’s wholesale gas rates by more than sixty percent.28  The Court of Appeals 
based its decision on the fact that because “the rate base should reflect the ‘present 
fair value’ of the property . . . the Commission . . . should have considered the 
reproduction cost and trended original cost” of the property.29  Additionally the 
Fourth Circuit held that the “actual legitimate cost . . . was not the proper measure 
of fair value.”30 
In its decision, the Supreme Court followed its precedent in Federal Power 
Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,31 and held that “[u]nder the statutory 
standard of ‘just and reasonable,’ it is the result reached, not the method employed, 
which is controlling.”32  Thus, federal courts and administrative agencies were no 
                                                                                                     
 19.  169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). 
 20.  PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 286 (explaining that Justice Harlan’s opinion would go on to 
become “the legal basis of the ‘fair value’ doctrine”). 
 21.  Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546.  
 22.  Id. at 546-47. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 287. 
 25.  Smyth, 169 U.S. at 547. 
 26.  320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
 27.  PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 297 (describing the Hope decision as resulting in a shift of focus 
away from rate base, and the determination of what constitutes its fair value, to the rate of return a utility 
is allowed on its rate base).  
 28.  Hope, 320 U.S. 591; PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 295-96. 
 29.  Hope, 320 U.S. at 599-600. 
 30.  Id. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In its holding, the court treated “actual legitimate 
cost” as being equivalent to “prudent investment.”  See id. 
 31.  315 U.S. 575 (1942). 
 32.  Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. 
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longer bound by the “fair value doctrine” in determining the rate base of a utility. 
This decision was not wholly without guidance.  The Court pointed out that it 
would be important to investors that rate-setting allow enough revenue to cover 
both the operating expenses and the capital costs of the business.33  Therefore, an 
investor’s return on investment should be “commensurate with returns on 
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.”34  Accordingly, the 
Court noted that “[r]ates which enable [a] company to operate successfully, to 
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for 
the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid.”35 
Thus, Hope gives substantial leeway to administrative agencies when setting 
rates, but it also indirectly outlines a fundamental principle of utility law: investors 
are entitled to a return only on their actual investments.  No longer would the 
precise method of valuation be the ultimate determinant of whether rates are “just 
and reasonable.”36  Instead, courts are required to look at the end result of the rate-
making process.37  Rates are just and reasonable so long as they assure confidence 
in the financial integrity of the company, allow the company to maintain its credit 
and attract capital, and allow investors a return on their investments commensurate 
with the risk of those investments.38 
C. The Fundamental Principle in Maine 
1. The Legislature 
In Maine, the fair value doctrine persisted until 1957, when the Legislature 
passed Legislative Document 249.39  This bill required that when the Commission 
determines the valuation of property for ratemaking purposes, “the reasonable 
value upon all property of any public utility used or required to be used in its 
service to the public within the state . . . [would be] established by the net prudent 
investment, and a fair return thereon.”40  In the same year, the Legislature further 
revised the rate making process by requiring that, “[i]n determining just and 
reasonable rates, the Commission shall provide such revenues to the utility as may 
be required to perform its public service and to attract necessary capital on just and 
reasonable terms.”41  Additionally, the Legislature not only struck the “current 
value” of the property from the list of factors to consider when determining the 
value of a utility’s rate base, but expressly prohibited its consideration.42  
                                                                                                     
 33.  Id. at 603. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 605 (emphasis added). 
 36.  Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. 
 37.  Id. at 602; see also Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 455 A.2d 34, 39 (Me. 1983) 
(citing Hope for the proposition that “since this Court’s review is limited to the ‘result reached and not 
the method employed,’ it should not disturb the Commission's result so long as [that result] is within a 
range of reasonableness supported by sufficient evidence”) (emphasis omitted). 
 38.  Hope, 320 U.S. at 603. 
 39.  L.D. 249 (98th Legis. 1957). 
 40.  Id. § 18. 
 41.  L.D. 1595, § 17 (98th Legis. 1957).  
 42.  L.D. 1595, § 2 (98th Legis. 1957). 
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Thus, in 1957 the Legislature enacted as statute the Supreme Court’s holding 
from Hope.43  By affirming that prudent acquisition cost is probative of the value of 
the property on which investors earn a “fair return,” and by stating that rates are 
“just and reasonable” when they allow a public utility to perform its public service 
and attract capital, the Legislature acknowledged that it is the investments actually 
made by investors upon which they are entitled to a return.44  While this 
acknowledgment may only be implicit in the statutory language, it is worthy to note 
that during House debates concerning the passage of Legislative Document 249, a 
House member of the Committee on Public Utilities expressly stated that the intent 
of the bill was that “there should be a full recognition of all costs incurred in 
investments actually made.  No return on costs not incurred or on investments not 
actually made.”45  Even discounting this as one statement by one member of the 
Legislature, and thus not representative of the body as a whole, this principle has 
also been recognized by the Law Court.46  
2. The Law Court 
While the Law Court acknowledged the codification of its reasoning from 
Hope in its 1978 decision in New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission,47 this principle has been most prominent in cases involving 
contributed property.  In Maine Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the court 
disallowed Maine Water Company from recovering depreciation on contributed 
property as the company had not made the initial investment in the property, and 
therefore had no investment to recover through depreciation.48  Similarly, in 
Rangeley Water Co. v. Rangeley Water District, the court emphasized that 
depreciation on contributed property was disallowed not because it would be 
credited to those who contributed the property, but “to insure that investors who did 
not supply capital for the contributed property do not recover on an ‘investment’ 
they did not make.”49  In Rangeley Water Co., the court went further and explicitly 
stated the Commission “will not permit utilities to recover . . . the depreciation on 
contributed property because the utility did not make the original investment in 
contributed property.”50  Thus, Rangeley Water Co. represents a significant 
development in that the court gave very precise instructions to the Commission that 
investors will not be able to recover, through depreciation, an investment that they 
did not make. 
While this line of cases is distinguishable from Bangor Gas in that they 
involve contributed property—whereas Bangor Gas involves the purchase of utility 
property sold at a loss by its prior investors—the underlying rationale is just as 
                                                                                                     
 43.  L.D. 249 (98th Legis. 1957); L.D. 1595 (98th Legis. 1957).  
 44.  L.D. 1595, §§ 2, 17 (98th Legis. 1957). 
 45.  1 Legis. Rec. 1407 (1957). 
 46.  See Me. Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 388 A.2d 493 (Me. 1978); Rangeley Water Co. v. 
Rangeley Water Dist., 1997 ME 32, 691 A.2d 171; infra text accompanying notes 46-53. 
 47.  New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 390 A.2d 8, 14 (Me. 1978).  
 48.  Me. Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 388 A.2d 493, 495 (Me. 1978). 
 49.  Rangeley Water Co., 691 A.2d at 178 (Me. 1997) (quoting Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 405 A.2d 153, 166-67 (Me. 1979)). 
 50.  Id. 
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pertinent.  In both of these cases the court’s disallowance of depreciation is based 
on the fact that the investors had not made the original investment in the 
contributed property.51  This disallowance was not made because the specific 
mechanism used, depreciation, made it impossible for the investors to recover on 
such a non-investment.52  Similarly, the fact that it is contributed property in these 
cases makes no difference because nowhere does the court premise its holdings on 
the specific type or conveyance of the property as being a reason for disallowing 
the deduction.  Instead, the court reasons very precisely that investors are not 
permitted to recover their non-investment because those investors “did not make 
the original investment in the contributed property.”53  
III. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE V. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
A. Factual Background 
Bangor Gas is a natural gas local distribution company that provides gas 
service to approximately 4,000 residential, commercial, and industrial customers in 
the greater Bangor area.54  Bangor Gas began providing service to customers in 
1998 as a startup gas utility of its parent company Penobscot Natural Gas 
(“Penobscot”).55  At that time both Bangor Gas and Penobscot were owned by 
Sempra Energy LLC.56  Because of the large front-end expenses associated with 
being a startup utility, the Public Utilities Commission approved Bangor Gas’s 
alternative rate plan (“ARP”) for a period of ten years.57  During this time Sempra 
Energy made substantial capital investments in Bangor Gas’s service 
infrastructure.58  Despite these investments, Bangor Gas was not profitable, and in 
2006, Sempra Energy sought to sell the company.59 
In December of 2006, Energy West offered to acquire Bangor Gas by 
purchasing Penobscot’s stock for $500,000.60  Due in part to both the pending sale 
and the lack of profitability, Sempra performed an impairment analysis of Bangor 
Gas’s assets after which it determined that the fair market value of those assets was 
                                                                                                     
 51.  Id. (“In a rate proceeding contributed property is not included in a utility’s rate base because it 
would be unfair to allow the utility’s investors to recoup from ratepayers money that the utility did not 
expend.”); see also Me. Water Co., 388 A.2d at 495 (“[T]he aim of depreciation . . . is to permit a utility 
to recover its original investment in the property.”). 
 52.  See Rangeley Water Co., 691 A.2d at 178 (distinguishing the valuation of contributed property 
for the purposes of ratemaking from the valuation of contributed property for the purpose of determining 
just compensation owed when property has been condemned under the exercise of eminent domain); see 
also Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n., 405 A.2d 153, 166-67 (Me. 1979) (“Depreciation on 
contributed property is therefore disallowed not to credit the donees, but to insure that investors who did 
not supply capital for the contributed property do not recover on an ‘investment’ they did not make.”). 
 53.  Me. Water Co., 388 A.2d at 495 (emphasis added).  
 54.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 3, 122 A.3d 959. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. ¶ 5. 
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$500,000.61  The impairment analysis resulted in Bangor Gas’s assets being written 
down to zero and Sempra recording an accounting loss of $38 million.62  With 
Commission approval, the sale was finalized in 2007 and, through this purchase, 
Energy West thus invested $500,000 in Bangor Gas compared to the $38 million 
invested and subsequently written down by Sempra.63  In November 2007, Bangor 
Gas’s ARP was extended for three years.64  Following the sale, Bangor Gas 
connected and put into service several sections of pipeline that were not in service 
when Sempra owned the company.65 
In December 2012, Bangor Gas filed a petition to renew its ARP for another 
ten-year period.66  Following the filing of this petition the Office of the Public 
Advocate filed a petition to intervene, which the Commission granted.67  Pursuant 
to title 35-A, section 4706(3) of the Maine Revised Statutes, and in order to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the proposed ARP, the Commission conducted a 
traditional rate-setting cost-of-service and revenue requirement analysis.68  
Following this analysis, the Commission authorized Bangor Gas’s ARP for a term 
of seven years.69  This authorization contained no change in rates.70  Subsequently, 
the OPA and Bucksport Mill appealed from the Commission’s order arguing that 
the Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it valued Bangor Gas’s 
assets based upon Sempra’s investment of $38 million instead of the $500,000 that 
Energy West paid to acquire the company.71 
B. The Law Court’s Decision 
The Law Court gives deference to Commission decisions and will only 
overturn a decision when the Commission “abuses the discretion entrusted to it or 
fails to follow the mandate of the legislature . . . .”72  Moreover, the court will only 
review questions of law and will not second guess the Commission’s fact finding.73 
In its analysis of the Commission’s decision, the Law Court first examined title 
35-A, section 303 of the Maine Revised Statutes, which provides that:  
In determining just and reasonable rates, tolls and charges, the commission shall 
fix a reasonable value upon all the property of a public utility . . . which is used or 
required to be used in its service to the public within the State and a fair return on 
that property.  In fixing a reasonable value, the commission shall give due 
consideration to evidence of the cost of the property when first devoted to public 
                                                                                                     
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id.; Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year Rate Plan (35-A 
M.R.S. § 4706), No. 2012-00598, Order at 11 (Me. P.U.C. 2014). 
 63.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶¶ 5-6, 122 A.3d 959. 
 64.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 65.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 66.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. ¶¶ 13-14. 
 72.  Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2014 ME 38, ¶ 24, 87 A.3d 749). 
 73.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 15, 122 A.3d 959; New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 390 A.2d 8, 15 (Me. 1978). 
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use and the prudent acquisition cost to the utility, less depreciation on each, and 
any other material and relevant factors or evidence, but the other factors shall not 
include current value.  In making a valuation, the commission may consult reports, 
records or other information available to it in the office of any state office or 
board.74 
In giving “due consideration” to these factors, the Law Court stated that the 
Commission has “broad discretion” to consider any “relevant or material” factor 
except for “current value”75 and that the Commission need not give equal weight to 
each factor.76  However, due consideration requires that each factor receive 
“reasonable and fair consideration,” and must be reflected in the finding of value.77 
In applying these standards in Bangor Gas, the Law Court found that the 
Commission gave the requisite due consideration to both Energy West’s acquisition 
cost as well as the original cost of the property when Sempra first put it to public 
use.78  Furthermore, the court held that the Commission’s rejection of Energy 
West’s acquisition cost, $500,000, and acceptance of Sempra’s original cost, $38 
million, as being more probative of the value of the property was entirely consistent 
with the Commission’s statutory authority.79  Moreover, these considerations were 
carefully made out of concerns for the productivity of the company, its ability to 
attract capital and provide a fair return to investors, and rate stability.80 
In responding to the OPA’s contention that the Commission had unlawfully 
used the “current value” or “fair market value” of the property to arrive at its 
decision, the Law Court stated that the Commission acted consistently with its 
“statutory mandate” when it made its determination of “reasonable value” by 
determining what value “would allow the utility to realize a fair return on equity in 
light of its current operations and service capacity.”81  After giving due 
consideration to all statutory factors, the Law Court found that the Commission had 
appropriately determined that the “original cost valuation more accurately reflected 
the reasonable value of the property” on which the company was entitled to a 
return.82  Thus, the Commission did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory 
authority when it determined that, for the purposes of determining rate-base, the 
$38 million invested by Sempra, and not the $500,000 paid by Energy West’s 
investors to acquire the company, more accurately reflected the value of Bangor 
Gas’s property.83 
                                                                                                     
 74.  35-A M.R.S.A § 303 (2010 & Supp. 2015). 
 75.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 18, 122 A.3d 959. 
 76.  Id. ¶ 19; Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 150 Me. 257, 262, 109 A.2d 512, 514 
(1954).  
 77.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 19, 122 A.3d 959; Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
150 Me. 257, 262, 109 A.2d 512, 514 (1954). 
 78.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 21, 122 A.3d 959. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. ¶ 22 (emphasis added). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Given the highly technical nature of utilities regulation, it is understandable 
that the Law Court would be reluctant to overturn a decision of the Public Utilities 
Commission.  However, the overwhelming difference in value represented by 
Sempra’s initial investment and Energy West’s subsequent purchase raises the 
question of what Bangor Gas signals for the future of energy law and judicial 
review in Maine.  
A. Fundamental Principle of Utility Law 
Not surprisingly, it is rare that a utility company will be purchased for less than 
the value of the investments made in that company’s assets.84  In Maine, the 
Commission has had only one prior opportunity to consider the value of rate base 
after such a purchase and that proceeding was resolved by an agreement between 
the parties.85  The prevailing treatment of such purchases by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is to require a “negative acquisition 
adjustment,” whereby the value of the property is determined by the acquisition 
cost and the excess of the book value over the acquisition cost is treated as 
additional accumulated depreciation.86  In one case embracing this issue, Locust 
Ridge Gas Co.,87  FERC explained that this prevents a company that purchases a 
facility from “realiz[ing] a return on, and . . . of, a larger amount than what it 
invested in acquiring [that] facility.”88  Because the facts of Locust Ridge and 
Bangor Gas are similar, it is worthwhile to examine this case more closely. 
In Locust Ridge, FERC denied Locust Ridge Gas Company’s motion for a 
rehearing after FERC ordered the company to reduce its rate base.89  Locust Ridge 
argued that FERC had incorrectly determined that Locust Ridge’s predecessor in 
interest had not written down the book value of its rate base.90  Because of this 
inaccuracy, Locust Ridge contended that FERC had erred when it allocated the loss 
in value reflected by this write down to the depreciated original cost of facilities.91  
Therefore, because the depreciated original cost had been used to determine the 
value of Locust Ridge’s rate base, rectifying this error would result in a larger rate 
                                                                                                      
 84.  Greenville Water Co., Millinocket Water Co., and Skowhegan Water Co., Application for 
Authorization to Sell Utility Property to Wanakah Water Co. (35-A M.R.S.A § 1101) and to Discontinue 
Service (35-A M.R.S.A § 1104), No. 92-250, Order Approving Stipulation at 2 (Me. P.U.C. 1992). This 
order, which approved a stipulation between the parties requiring a negative acquisition adjustment that 
lowered the value of the utility’s rate base, represents the only other time in the last sixty years where 
the Maine Public Utilities Commission has considered the rate treatment of a utility purchased for less 
than what the prior owner had invested. Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See, e.g., N. Border Pipeline Co., 82 FERC ¶ 62,151 (1998) (final agency order approving a 
below book value purchase resulting in a negative acquisition adjustment); Gulf Shore Energy Partners, 
LP, 142 FERC ¶ 61227 (2013) (order approving a company’s proposed negotiated rate agreements after 
showing compliance with a prior directive ordering the company to revise its proposed rates to reflect a 
negative acquisition adjustment). 
 87.  Locust Ridge Gas Co., 29 FERC ¶ 61052 (1984). 
 88.  Id. at ¶ 61,114. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at ¶ 61,113. 
 91.  Id.  
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base and higher rates for the company.92  In essence, this “fix” would allow the 
company to include the original net cost of utility property in its rate base despite 
having purchased the property for less than that cost.93  FERC rejected this 
argument94 stating that, due to long standing policy,95 even if Locust Ridge’s 
assertions were true it would not be allowed an increase in rate base as that would 
violate the fundamental principle that investors are only allowed a return on their 
investment.96 
When comparing the factual circumstances of Locust Ridge with those in 
Bangor Gas, it is evident that the core of these cases is the same.  Both involve a 
utility that was purchased for less than the original cost and both involve an attempt 
by the purchasing company to use the larger original cost figure when determining 
the utilities’ respective rate bases.  The only substantive difference is in the 
outcome of these cases.  While the Locust Ridge decision only provides persuasive 
authority in Maine and other states, the fundamental principle, which underlies this 
decision, has been recognized in Maine.97  In light of this recognition, the absence 
of any discussion of this fundamental utility law principle in the Bangor Gas 
decision is conspicuous.  While this point was briefed and presented at oral 
argument,98 the court did not respond to the contention that it has recognized this 
principle in previous decisions.  One theory as to why this issue was not addressed 
is that because this principle supports accepting Energy West’s acquisition cost as 
the value of Bangor Gas’s rate base, the court simply did not want to confront it 
when affirming the Commission’s decision to reject the acquisition cost factor.  By 
holding that the Commission has the discretion to assign the weight to the factors 
considered in valuing property—and therefore concluding that the Commission’s 
rejection of the acquisition cost factor was properly made—the Court necessarily 
had to overlook the substantial support that the fundamental principle gives to 
utilizing Energy West’s acquisition cost in determining the value of property.  
However, even without addressing this principle the court’s approach is flawed 
because it fails to acknowledge that the Commission does not have the discretion to 
reject consideration of a factor based on a value judgment of that particular factor’s 
weight.99  
                                                                                                     
 92.  Id. (referencing the prepared testimony of one of Locust Ridge’s directors wherein he states that 
the company’s predecessor had made the accounting entries and the value reflected by those entries 
should be added back to the company’s rate base). 
 93.  Id. at ¶ 61,114. If this cost had been included then the value of Locust Ridge’s rate base would 
have been increased by $1.1 million over the less than $350,000 that the company paid for the property. 
Id. at ¶ 61,115. 
 94.  Id. at ¶ 61,114. 
 95.  Id. (“The Commission's long-standing policy on property acquisitions is to allow a purchaser to 
record acquisitions at the lesser of (i) the depreciated original cost or (ii) the actual purchase price.”). 
 96.  See Id. 
 97.  See Me. Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 388 A.2d 493 (Me. 1978); Rangeley Water Co. v. 
Rangeley Water District, 1997 ME 32, 691 A.2d 171; see also supra text accompanying notes 46-53.  
 98.  Br. for Office of the Pub. Advocate at 29, Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, 122 A.3d 959 (No. PUC-
14-414); Br. for Verso Paper at 36, Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, 122 A.3d 959 (No. PUC-14-414). 
 99.  See 35-A M.R.S.A. § 303 (2010 & Supp. 2015); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
150 Me. 257, 262, 109 A.2d 512, 514 (1954) [hereinafter CMP]. 
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B. Bangor Gas’s Prudent Acquisition Cost Was Not Given “Due 
Consideration” 
When the Law Court reviews a ratemaking decision of the Commission, so 
long as the Commission’s decision is reasonable and supported by substantial 
evidence, it will apply a deferential standard of review to the Commission’s fact-
finding and methodology adopted in the ratemaking proceeding.100  However, when 
the Commission “abuses the discretion entrusted to it or fails to follow the mandate 
of the legislature,” a question of fact will become a question of law, and it will be 
proper for the court to intervene.101  In following the mandate of the Legislature, 
the Commission must give “due consideration” to evidence that would tend to 
establish any factor that is statutorily required to be considered.102  
In Bangor Gas, this last factor was of primary importance to the court’s 
analysis.103  Citing Central Maine Power v. Public Utilities Commission,104 the 
court states that although the Commission must give “due consideration” to all 
statutory factors, it need not give equal weight to each factor.105  The court then 
goes on to explain that in CMP the Commission had acted within the bounds of its 
discretion when it gave little weight to the “acquisition cost” of the property 
included in rate base and instead weighed the “original cost” of the property more 
heavily.106  Furthermore, the court explicitly states that this exercise of discretion 
was appropriate because the property in CMP had been substantially retired.107  
Therefore, in light of the court’s decision in CMP, the court in Bangor Gas held 
that the Commission acted “[c]onsistently [within] its statutory authority when it 
rejected the acquisition cost factor and accepted the original cost factor as the more 
reasonable value on which to base Bangor Gas’s base rates and resulting return on 
equity.”108  This analogy, however, is inconsistent. 
In CMP the court stated that the Commission need not give equal weight to 
each statutory factor when determining the value of property included in rate 
base.109  Yet the court went on to explain that once a factor is “well proven,” that 
factor must be reflected in the finding of value given to the property included in 
rate base.110  In other words, without such a “reflection” in the finding of value, it 
cannot be said that the factor has been “duly considered.”111  The Commission’s 
decision in CMP was premised on the fact that because CMP had made its 
                                                                                                      
 100.  New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 470 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 1984) (citing Cent. 
Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 405 A.2d 153, 182 (Me. 1979)). 
 101.  New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 148 Me. 374, 377, 94 A.2d 801, 803 
(1953). 
 102.  35-A M.R.S.A § 303 (2010 & Supp. 2015); CMP, 150 Me. at 262. 
 103.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶¶ 19-21, 122 A.3d 959. 
 104.  150 Me. at 262. 
 105.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 19, 122 A.3d 959. 
 106.  Id. ¶ 19; CMP, 150 Me. at 267. 
 107.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 19, 122 A.3d 959; CMP, 150 Me. at 267. 
 108.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 21, 122 A.3d 959. 
 109.  CMP, 150 Me. at 262.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See CMP, 150 Me. at 262. 
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acquisition of the property “many years ago”112 and because the property was 
depreciable, the company’s prudent investment in the property was therefore not 
illustrative of the value of the property for ratemaking purposes.113  
The result in CMP is wholly consistent with the requirement that a “well 
proven” factor be reflected in the finding of value.  Although the company had 
shown that it had “prudently acquired” the property and that this acquisition cost 
was in excess of the “original cost” of the property, because the property had been 
substantially retired —and therefore not in service—and because the company had 
made this investment “many years ago,” the acquisition cost should not have been 
weighed heavily when valuing the property for the current rate-proceeding.  
Perhaps more importantly, because the property was depreciable, the company’s 
investment had already been recovered.114  Therefore, evidence of the company’s 
“prudent acquisition cost” would not be probative of the value of the property for 
the purposes of allowing investors a “fair return” on their investment, and a finding 
that the acquisition cost should be given little weight would be a fair reflection of 
its probative value. 
Unlike in CMP, the property in Bangor Gas had been purchased recently and 
had not been owned long enough to allow for any recovery through depreciation.115  
Also unlike the situation in CMP, the property in Bangor Gas had not been 
“substantially retired.”  Bangor Gas had begun operation as a start-up gas utility in 
1998116 and, as the court acknowledged, the company had installed much of its 
infrastructure within a ten-year period beginning at the time of its operation.117  
While it is true that certain sections of gas pipelines had not yet been placed in 
service,118 this was not due to the retirement of property, but was instead due to 
concerns of profitability and the loss of one of Bangor Gas’s largest customers.119  
Therefore, unlike in CMP, the acquisition cost of Bangor Gas’s property was an 
especially relevant factor in valuing the property for the purposes of setting a fair 
rate of return on Energy West’s investment.  Thus, because of these key differences 
between CMP and Bangor Gas, it was erroneous for the Law Court to place any 
weight on its CMP decision in reasoning that perfunctory consideration of the 
acquisition cost factor could constitute “due consideration.” 
In its Bangor Gas decision the Law Court acknowledged that the Commission 
did not weigh the acquisition cost factor in a vacuum, but only after reviewing the 
                                                                                                     
 112.  The court in CMP does not mention exactly how “many years ago” CMP had acquired the 
property, but does use a period of forty years when determining whether the Commission’s erroneous 
method of calculating the original cost of the property less depreciation was prejudicial to CMP.  Id. at 
266. 
 113.  Id. at 267. 
 114.  See Me. Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 388 A.2d 493, 495 (Me. 1978) (“[T]he aim of 
depreciation . . . is to permit a utility to recover its original investment in the property.”). 
 115.  Whereas a total of only five years had elapsed between Energy West’s acquisition of Bangor 
Gas and the company’s petition to renew its alternative rate plan, see Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶¶ 6, 
8, 122 A.3d 959, in CMP the property had been acquired at least forty years prior to the rate-proceeding. 
See CMP, 150 Me. at 266. 
 116.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 3, 122 A.3d 959.  
 117.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 118.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 119.  Id. ¶ 4. 
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original cost of the Bangor Gas property.120  The court stated that the Commission’s 
rejection of the acquisition cost was fair because the Commission gave “careful 
consideration” to: (1) Bangor Gas’s productivity; (2) the company’s ability to 
attract capital and realize a fair return on equity; and (3) policy concerns for rate 
stability.121  
Although the Legislature has given the Commission wide discretion to 
consider any “material and relevant factors or evidence,”122 the Commission’s 
“desire to have rates increase gradually rather than suddenly is not a sufficient basis 
for the rejection of competent, probative evidence.”123  Accordingly, the 
Commission cannot arbitrarily disregard “evidence tending to establish any factor 
critical to the determination of a just and reasonable rate.”124  In other words, the 
Commission cannot wholly reject competent probative evidence based simply on a 
value judgment that another factor should be weighed more heavily in the analysis.  
Therefore, while other factors may weigh more heavily in the valuation analysis—
because acquisition cost is suggestive of the value of the property—the bare weight 
of these other factors is insufficient to reject outright the acquisition cost when 
determining the value of rate base.  Thus, because the acquisition cost factor was 
given no weight in Bangor Gas, and therefore not reflected in the ultimate finding 
of value, the Commission did not give “due consideration” to the acquisition cost 
of the property.  
C. The Law Court’s Rejection of OPA’s Current Value Argument 
One contention that the court does address in its decision is the argument that 
the Commission used the statutorily prohibited “current value” factor in its order 
approving Bangor Gas’s ARP.125  As mentioned previously, when the Commission 
abuses its discretion or fails to follow the mandate of the Legislature, the Law 
Court may properly review the Commission’s factual findings as questions of law 
and not of fact.126  Therefore, any consideration of the current value of Bangor 
Gas’s assets would fail to follow the Legislature’s mandate and would be subject to 
reversal.  
The OPA argued that the Commission’s decision to ignore Energy West’s 
purchase price of Bangor Gas was premised on the current value of Bangor Gas’s 
assets.127  To support its argument, the OPA cited language in the Commission’s 
order stating that there was no “impairment in the functional use or revenue 
                                                                                                     
 120.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  35-A M.R.S.A. § 303 (2010 & Supp. 2015). 
 123.  In re Me. Motor Rate Bureau, 357 A.2d 518, 528 (Me. 1976). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 22, 122 A.3d 959; see also 35-A M.R.S.A. § 303 (2010 & Supp. 
2015). 
 126.  New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 148 Me. 374, 377, 94 A.2d 801, 803 
(1953). 
 127.  Brief for Office of the Pub. Advocate at 24, Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, 122 A.3d 959 (No. 
PUC-14-414). 
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producing ability of Bangor Gas’s facilities today,”128 and that the acquisition cost 
“would not accurately reflect the current use of the utility’s assets.”129  This 
emphasis on the “current use” and “revenue producing ability” were, as the OPA 
contended, “the basic inquiry of a current value analysis.”130 
Responding to this argument, the Law Court stated that any discussion of 
Bangor Gas’s facilities was undertaken only in order to determine a value of the 
property that would allow the company to “realize a fair return on equity in light of 
its current operations and service capacity.”131  After examining all of this evidence 
the Law Court held that the Commission’s determination, that the original cost of 
the property more accurately reflected the value of the property, did not constitute 
an abuse of its discretion or exceed its statutory authority.132  
The court’s conclusion is troubling because it appears to directly contravene 
the fundamental principle that investors are entitled to only a return on their 
investment.  By affirming the Commission’s decision to adopt the $38 million 
value represented by the original cost factor, the Law Court allowed Energy West’s 
investors to obtain a return on an amount that is far in excess of the capital that was 
invested.  The conclusion that the Commission’s decision was appropriate because 
it allowed Energy West’s investors to obtain a return on their equity investment “in 
light of [the company’s] current operations and service capacity,”133 cannot rest on 
the premise that Energy West’s investors bear the risk of the 38 million dollar 
investment because this risk was borne, and realized, by Sempra when Sempra 
absorbed the loss by writing down the value of Bangor Gas’s assets and selling the 
Company at a loss.134  Similarly, while investors are entitled to sufficient revenue in 
order to cover the costs associated with running the utility, such costs are not 
included in the valuation of the utility’s property, but in a separate figure.135  By 
rejecting the OPA’s contentions the court implicitly acknowledged that, despite 
allowing investors to recover on an amount that they did not invest, did not bear the 
risk for, and did not need in order to cover costs, recovery on the $38 million was 
appropriate because that figure more accurately represented the “current operations 
and service capacity” of the utility.  Assuredly, this must, at least to the OPA, sound 
frustratingly close to saying that the $38 million valuation was proper because it 
more accurately represented the “current value” of the utility. 
                                                                                                     
 128.  Id. (quoting Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year Rate Plan 
(35-A M.R.S. § 4706), No. 2012-00598, Order at 14-15 (Me. P.U.C. 2014)) (emphasis added). 
 129.  Brief for the Office of the Pub. Advocate at 24-25, Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, 122 A.3d 959  
(No. PUC-14-414) (quoting Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year 
Rate Plan (35-A M.R.S. § 4706), No. 2012-00598, Order at 14-15 (Me. P.U.C. 2014)) (emphasis added). 
 130.  Brief for the Office of the Pub. Advocate at 24, Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, 122 A.3d 959 (No. 
PUC-14-414). 
 131.  Bangor Gas, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 22, 122 A.3d 959. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. ¶ 5; Bangor Gas Co., LLC, Request for Approval of Renewal of Multi-Year Rate Plan (35-A 
M.R.S. § 4706), No. 2012-00598, Order at 11 (Me. P.U.C. 2014). 
 135.  See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 448 A.2d 272, 284 (Me. 1982) (“The 
purpose of rate of return is to provide a public utility sufficient revenue to cover the company’s total 
costs of service. Those costs include both the operating expenses of the utility and an adequate return on 
the investment of the utility in property and equipment serving the public.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
With its decision in Bangor Gas, the Law Court continued a long tradition of 
refraining from interjecting itself into the ratemaking decisions of the Public 
Utilities Commission.  Perhaps this is understandable because the court has neither 
the engineering nor technical skill to decide what rates are reasonable and just.136  
When it comes to reviewing these decisions, however, the court’s practice of 
judicial restraint and deference to administrative decisions may become strained 
when, as in this case, the review involves a mixed question of fact and law.  While 
there is no doubt that it would be improper for the court to take upon itself the 
question of what constitutes a just and reasonable rate, for a system of 
administrative governance to succeed, the court must still ensure that the Public 
Utilities Commission follows the mandate of the Legislature.  The role that the Law 
Court plays in striking the proper balance of deference to administrative bodies is 
particularly important when, as here, the Legislature has offered specific guidance 
to the Commission in the form of factors to consider in its decision-making.  Thus, 
when the Law Court affirms a decision of the Public Utilities Commission allowing 
investors to recover on an investment not made, the affirmance not only runs 
contrary to fundamental principles of utility law, but also signals the wide 
discretion that the court is willing to grant the Commission in its decision-making 
authority.  In fact, given the Commission’s failure to accord any weight to Energy 
West’s purchase price, the court’s affirmance signals just how deferentially it 
reviews Commission orders.  In other words, so long as the Commission discusses 
a relevant factor, the court will be unlikely to overturn the Commission’s decision 
on the ground that it had failed to “duly consider” that factor.  Thus, this decision 
not only diverges from the national consensus regarding the treatment of property 
that is purchased for less than the cost of the investments made in the property, but 
it also has implications for those cases that do not involve the valuation of utility 
property at all.  The most immediate of these being that, given the wide discretion 
afforded to Commission decisions, those who seek to appeal a decision of the 
Commission on the ground that it has committed an abuse of discretion will likely 
think twice before doing so. 
  
                                                                                                     
 136.  See, e.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 148 Me. 374, 377, 94 A.2d 801, 
803. 
